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Abstract
Can German national institutional frameworks be reconfigured to allow radical
innovation in science-based industries? This paper examines the development of
commercial technologies for entrepreneurial biotechnology start-up firms in
Germany. During the 1980s and early 1990s an inadequate institutional
infrastructure stifled virtually all attempts to organize entrepreneurial biotech start-up
firms within Germany, while most large German pharmaceutical firms quickly
invested in international alliances with US biotechnology companies and university
research labs.
The paper links the poor performance of the German biotech industry with a variety
of institutional disincentives created by the broad institutional orientation of the
German economy. Problems discussed include inadequate performance incentives
within German firms, rigidities within the labor market for scientists and managers,
and constraints on the provision of venture capital created by the broadly bank-
centered orientation of German capital markets. Because these institutional
arrangements strongly advantage a large coalition of German firms in a wide variety
of engineering intensive industries, the paper argues that fundamental institutional
reforms to better support science-based industries like biotechnology are unlikely.
However, noting the recent upswing in the German biotechnology industry, the paper
suggests that sector-specific policies may create an atmosphere conducive to large-
scale entry into some quickly growing market segments of biotechnology in which
the financial and technological risks are lower than in pure therapeutics research.
Zusammenfassung
Können Deutschlands nationale institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen so verändert
werden, daß radikale Innovationen in forschungsintensiven Industrien möglich
werden? Der Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklung marktorientierter Technologien für
Unternehmensneugründungen im Biotechnologie-Sektor in Deutschland.
In den 80er und frühen 90er Jahre blockierte eine ungeeignete institutionelle
Infrastruktur fast alle Versuche unternehmerischer Biotechnologie-Neugründungen
in Deutschland. Die meisten großen deutschen Pharma-Konzerne investierten
demzufolge in internationale Verbindungen mit Biotechnologie-Firmen und
universitären Forschungslaboren in den USA. Der Beitrag zeigt die Wechselwirkung
zwischen der schwachen Leistungsfähigkeit der deutschen Biotechnologie-Industrie
mit den institutionellen Hindernisse in der deutschen Volkswirtschaft. Zu den
angesprochenen Problemen gehören unzureichende Leistungsanreize in den
deutschen Unternehmen, mangelnde Flexibilität auf dem Arbeitsmarkt für
Wissenschaftler und Manager und Beschränkungen im Angebot von Wagniskapital,
bedingt durch die weitgehend bankzentrierten deutsche Kapitalmärkte. Weil diese
institutionellen Gegebenheiten große Vorzüge für viele Unternehmen in der
verarbeitenden Industrien bieten, wird hier die These vertreten, daß grundlegende
institutionelle Reformen zur besseren Unterstützung forschungsintensiver Industrien
wie Biotechnologie unwahrscheinlich sind.
Dennoch ist angesichts des jüngsten Aufschwungs in der deutschen Biotechnologie-
Industrie vorstellbar, daß sektor-spezifische Maßnahmen dazu beitragen können,
daß zahlreiche Unternehmensgründungen in jenen schnell wachsenden
Marktsegmenten der Biotechnologie-Branche erfolgen, in denen die finanziellen und
technologischen Risiken niedriger sind als in der reinen Therapeutika-Forschung.
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11. Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the US political economy has evolved to support commercial
innovation in biotechnology, software, and a variety of other industries relying on
radical innovation, often with close links with basic science. US national institutional
frameworks have fostered a dramatic expansion of innovative activities within the
economy. Institutional frameworks have been reconfigured to foster high-risk venture
capital financing of dynamic start-up companies, new links between university
scientists and companies, and the reorganization of large company decision-making
and incentive schemes. In Germany firms and policy-makers are anxiously
experimenting with their own institutional frameworks to foster organizational
structures supporting radical science-based innovation in their own country.
Can German national institutional frameworks be reconfigured to allow radical
innovation in science-based industries? This paper examines the development of
commercial technologies for entrepreneurial biotechnology start-up firms in
Germany. The broader goal is to examine the degree to which national institutional
frameworks can be reconfigured to better support commercial innovation in newly
emerging science-based industries. National institutional frameworks provide
incentives and impose constraints that influence the ability of firms to create a
variety of organizational structures and human resource competencies needed to
innovate. In the biotechnology case important national institutional frameworks
include the financial system, the education and training system, laws and other
institutions influencing the development of careers and decision-making within large
companies, and the system governing relations between companies.
Germany presents an especially intriguing case. During the 1980s and early
1990s an inadequate institutional infrastructure stifled virtually all attempts to
organize entrepreneurial biotech start-up firms within Germany, while most large
German pharmaceutical firms quickly invested in international alliances with US
biotechnology companies and university research labs. The technological regime
underpinning biotechnology necessitates the creation of company organizational
structures that are difficult to sustain within Germany’s business-coordinated market
economy. Long-term career structures within most German firms, combined with the
willingness of German courts to uphold anti-poaching clauses within labor contracts,
limits the active labor market of scientists and financial experts needed to form start-
up companies. Similarly, the lack of a strong NASDAQ-style market by which start-
ups can go public limits the availability of high-risk venture capital. This makes it
difficult for German start-up companies to create high-powered incentives for
employees. Furthermore, the lack of an exit option limits the emergence of a
refinancing mechanism for start-up capital based on funds generated through initial
2public offerings (IPOs). This also may prevent venture capitalists from engaging in
„portfolio“ strategies when investing in start-up companies.
However, in recent years the tide may be shifting. In Germany there is currently
a large push by the government to promote the development of a biotechnology
sector comparable to that in the United States. The official goal of the German
government is to be the European leader in biotechnology by the turn of the century.
To promote this goal, the federal and Länder governments have spent large sums in
support of „Gene centers“ that include new basic research facilities, „incubator labs“
for start-up companies, and the inclusion of matching funds up to a fifty percent
basis for virtually all private venture or bank-based capital for biotechnology
activities. This catalyst has created a biotech boom in Germany, particularly within
the Munich area. From scarcely a handful of companies at the beginning of the
1990s, there are now several hundred bio-tech start-up firms in Germany.
The recent success of German biotechnology promotion programs presents an
important puzzle for research. The short-term success of German industrial policies
to support biotechnology indicates that, at the local level, the company
organizational structures, financial links, and networks with universities needed for
radical innovation can exist within Germany. This paper focuses primarily on only
one part of the puzzle: the creation of viable institutional structures to stimulate and
nurture high-technology start-up firms in biotechnology. It thus ignores equally
important problems associated with the creation of biotechnology competencies in
large firms as well as the creation of links between universities and other public
research institutes and the private sector.
The paper is organized into two general sections, followed by a conclusion. The
first section examines the generally static situation during the 1980s. During the
1980s commercial biotechnology research was largely moribund in Germany. I first
briefly describing the newfound importance during the 1980s of biotechnology
methodologies to pharmaceutical research strategies through examining the
comparative performance of US and UK firms (which had access to new
biotechnology start-up firms) to German firms (which generally did not). I then
examine more carefully the technological regime underpinning therapeutics research
within biotechnology and how German national institutional frameworks broadly
disadvantage the creation of financial, company organizational, and career-structure
competencies that have been developed by US biotech firms to successfully
innovate. Examining the largely static institutional frameworks during the 19080s
allows a more careful appraisal of institutional reforms and governmental
promotional policies that have been created during the 1990s.
The second section attempts to create a framework for examining the more fluid
situation during the 1990s. It first examines general industry dynamics during this
period, which are generally favorable to new entry in biotechnology. I then examine
three scenarios for institutional reform in Germany: convergence, specialization, and
3accommodation. There is little evidence supporting the view that German national
institutional frameworks are converging to a US/UK liberal market economy model.
There is strong evidence supporting view that German national institutional
frameworks promote a specialization in a wide-variety of high-value niche markets in
process technologies (the „DQP“ strategy) while US and UK frameworks better
conduce towards radically innovative product market strategies. However, there is
also evidence supporting the view that some forms of high-technology start-up
activity can be „accommodated“ within Germany’s generally unfavorable institutional
environment.
Incremental reforms in German financial laws supported by the bulk of German
industry, combined with a number of sectoral industrial policies, have created
opportunities for firms to create alternative governance structures needed to
accommodate some forms of biotech start-up activity.
2. Problems Undermining the Development of German Commercial
Biotechnology During the 1980s
2.1 Market and Technological Dynamics in Pharmaceuticals and the
Performance of German Firms
During the 1980s there were substantial performance differences across the German
as opposed to the US or UK pharmaceutical industries. Table 1 includes a number of
aggregate market characteristics for the five largest pharmaceutical producing
nations. Using several summary measures, we can construct a picture of a given
nation’s competitive position at the beginning of the 1990s. The number of products
in the Top 50 is included to account for the fact that although some new chemical
compunds (NCEs) introduced are genuinely original, others may be marginal
improvements only which could then make the NCE figures somewhat misleading.
Market share in the US is included as a crude measure of competitiveness, because
the US market is the most open and competitive market in the world.
A comparison with the United Kingdom is a good gauge for the strength of the
German pharmaceutical industry during the 1980s. Taking R&D intensity into
account, the German and UK pharmaceutical industries spend roughly equivalent
absolute sums on R&D. However, the UK industry substantially outperformed
Germany. Its leading firm, Glaxo, for example, rose from 17th in the world in terms of
sales in 1983, to 1st in the world in 1995. There has also been a relative increase in
R&D expenditure in the UK, and furthermore, its companies are extremely good at
developing NCEs that are commercially successful. During the 1981-1990 period,
4only 28 new drugs were developed, but a relatively high percentage of these turned
into blockbusters. Germany, on the other hand, has a much weaker position. It
developed far more drugs (67 NCEs between 1981 and 1990), spends approximately
the same amount on R&D, but has a very low number of blockbusters to account for
this (only 5 in 1990). As a final measure of international competitiveness. Germany’s
share of the US market is only 4.6%, compared to 14.6% for the UK.
Beginning in the late 1970s, competitive industry dynamics have become more
complex. This was due to radical changes in the nature of the innovation process
and the introduction of new marketing and distribution techniques. Though both are
important (see Casper and Matraves, 1997), this project focuses primarily on
changes in the technological process and their impact on company organizational
competencies and alliances.
Table 1 here
How has the development of biotechnology impacted the performance of large
pharmaceutical firms? Biotechnology has displaced traditional ‘chemical’
capabilities. The traditional methodology, prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s when
knowledge about the properties of the compounds that could be used to synthesize
new drugs was still lacking, screened thousands of chemical compounds for efficacy
against a given disease (Schwartzman, 1976). In the 1970s, basic biomedical
knowledge increased. The traditional methodology has been replaced by ‘rational
drug design’, i.e., the development of more precise models of how particular
diseases function, and the design of molecules designed to target particular cells or
cause particular biological interactions within the body (see Werth, 1995; Powell,
1996: 204). In addition, genetic engineering techniques have allowed biotechnology
companies to manipulate the structure and functioning of so-called „large molecule“
proteins that cannot be synthesized through traditional chemical processes.
When a fundamentally new research methodology is created, it is often the case
that organizational rigidity and inertia hinder incumbents’ ability to take advantage of
new opportunities. Following the logic of technological life-cycles, radical
innovations in biotechnology have created incentives for hundreds of new firms to
enter the market, paralleling periods of rapid market entry following similar periods of
rapid technological change in semiconductors, software, and other high-technology
industries. As research is one of the highly specialized and hence value-added
processes, the fact that most biotechnological research is taking place within small
start-ups rather than large firms is an important change (see Powell, 1996).
However, although the discovery process is changing, the specialized assets
needed for development and commercialization are not, and these assets continue
to be owned by the largest firms (see Teece, 1986).  Only about 10% of the total
R&D costs of a new patented drug are in discovery; the vast majority of costs are
found in development, clinical trials, and the regulatory approval process. Tiny
5biotechnology start-up firms rarely evolve into large pharmaceutical firms. Rather,
due to the high cost and long time-horizons in therapeutics research (see below),
most biotechnology companies sell or license their patents to pharmaceutical firms
for continuing financing long before their discoveries reach the market. Further
development and commercialization is then taken over by large pharmaceutical
firms.
The challenge created by biotechnology for large firms is primarily one of rivalry
with other integrated pharmaceutical companies. Having access to new
competencies in drug design, disease modeling, and screening created by
biotechnology are widely viewed as critical for competitive success (see Zucker et
al., 1997). In the world of rational drug design, research in complex disease areas
usually takes place along a number of distinct research trajectories. For example,
Penan (1996) identifies over fifteen distinct research programs to fight Alzheimer’s
disease, each of which was supported by a different constellation of university
departments, large pharmaceutical firms, and in some cases, biotechnology firms. In
addition, the therapies for some of the more complicated diseases, such as AIDS
and most likely Alzheimer’s disease, often consist of ‘cocktails’ of two or more
compounds developed through separate research programs. Developing alliances
with biotech firms helps pharmaceutical firms diversify the lines of research within
which the large firm can take part.
Developing licensing arrangements and research collaborations with
biotechnology firms helps diversify the pharmaceutical firm's ‘bets’ across a number
of research programs. Each therapeutic area becomes a platform from which the firm
can monitor the field, purchase promising compounds from third parties, or develop
collaborative research projects with universities or research firms, or starting in-
house research projects. Nurturing third party research firms can also help to
diversify commercial risks. Developing drugs is an inherently risky business: it is
estimated that 1 compound from an initial 5,000 will be successful (PhRMA, 1997). If
in-house research in one therapeutic area is unsuccessful, purchasing compounds
developed by third parties can help to fill gaps in the development pipeline.
It follows from this discussion that the pharmaceutical firms with easy access to
biotech start-up firms, via strategic alliances, research networks, mergers, and so
forth should have an important competitive advantage in responding to these
changed technological conditions over firms that do not.  The superior performance
of the UK and US industries compared to Germany follows directly from this second
conclusion. The United States and, to an increasing extent, the United Kingdom,
have national systems of innovation conducive to the support of high-risk start-up
firms in emerging technologies. Large clusters of biotechnology start-up firms were
created in the US and (to a substantial, but lesser extent) UK. To obtain long-term
financing, access to development and marketing expertise, and forge research
networks, large numbers of these start-up firms quickly formed alliances with local
pharmaceutical companies. Through these networks large pharmaceutical
6companies could monitor technology developments, license or co-develop
compounds, and begin to develop internal competencies through mergers, equity
holdings, or the recruitment of scientists working within biotech firms.
I thus link these performance differences to the ability of firms in Germany to
plug into emerging networks of commercial biotech research that were blooming in
the UK and especially the US but largely moribund in Germany. During the 1990s
the situation has changed. To close the technology gap, German pharmaceutical
firms have created a massive network of international research networks, primarily
with US biotechnology firms and public research universities and hospitals (Sharpe
and Patel, 1996). At the same time, German national and regional government
offices have undertaken a number of substantial technology promotion programs in
the area of biotechnology. This raises the possibility of institutional reforms that
could lead to a national system of innovation more conducive to the creation and
nurturing of high-tech start-up firms. However, during the 1980s German
pharmaceutical firms relied primarily on domestic R&D while a variety of national
institutional frameworks that are important in nurturing clusters of start-up firms were
stable. This allows a relatively clear analysis of the German situation in the 1980s,
which can then be used later to understand scenarios for reform during the 1990s.
2.2 National Institutional Frameworks and Competency Building
How do national institutional frameworks impede the creation of the human capital
skills and organizational relationships needed for small-firms to innovate in
biotechnology? National institutional frameworks influence the governance costs of
embarking on particular product market strategies. My argument differs from the
„embededness“ approach often found in sociological studies (see Hollingsworth and
Boyer, 1997). In its simplest form, this position holds that company organizational
structures are shaped directly by the orientation of national institutional frameworks.
Rather, I assume that company management, faced with international competition,
can survey the spectrum of possible organizational arrangements prevalent within
their industry, and attempt to shape a coherent strategy. National institutional
frameworks play a strong role through influencing the relative cost of building the
organizational competencies needed to pursue each strategy.
To create successful product market strategies, the management of companies
must create and sustain relationships with a number of different groups: workers,
technicians and scientists, owners and banks, and other companies. Economists,
game theorists, and political scientists have in recent years combined rational choice
theory, strategic bargaining models, and organizational analysis to form a broad
body of theoretical and empirical analysis exploring each of these relationships (see
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992 and Miller, 1992 for overviews).  This literature, the
economics of organization, has developed a unified methodology showing that most
7substantive management problems are not just technical challenges but also pose
strategic conflicts of interest between participants (so called „relational problems“).
The economics of organization approach has, along these lines, developed a
competency-based view to understanding technology and innovation. The
technologies needed to innovate rarely consist of specialized machines or codifiable
knowledge that can be transferred to any organization regardless of institutional
environment, and simply be „turned on“. Rather, most technologies are dispersed
across highly skilled experts embedded within complex organizational structures.
Innovative capacity usually consists of tacit knowledge spread over networks of
managers, scientists, and skilled-workers within a complex organizational
environment (which often spreads across several discrete firms, or, in science-based
industries, firms and public research institutes).
The complex of legal and private rules that are created to manage
organizational relationships are commonly called „governance structures“
(Williamson, 1985).  Because its goal is the development of a universal approach to
understanding industrial organization, economics of organization scholars often
implicitly assumes that companies create their own, private governance structures to
solve their contracting dilemmas.  This ignores the fact that there are systematic
differences in the governance structures developed within Germany and the United
States. These variations will be linked to differences in national institutional
frameworks governing company relationships in the US and Germany. I first present
thumbnail sketches of these institutional differences, and then examine more
specifically how particular aspects of these institutions influence the creation of
viable company organizational competencies needed for radical innovation (see
Soskice, 1994).
The United States is characterized by a liberal market economy. Business
organization depends primarily on market transactions and the use of a flexible,
enabling private legal system to facilitate a variety of complex contracting situations.
Because courts refuse to adjudicate incomplete contracts (see Schwarz, 1992),
market participants need to specify control rights in contract to as full an extent as
possible or, when this is not possible, to use extremely high-powered performance
incentives to align interests within and across organizations. Rather paradoxically,
this system of legal and corporate governance advantages the creation of
governance structures suitable for two very dissimilar product market strategies. On
one hand, it promotes a variety of price-based mass production industries dependent
on complete, often asymmetrical and opportunistic contracts between large firms/top
managers and dedicated suppliers/unskilled workers, respectively. On the other
hand, and of more interest in this project, the US system of legal and corporate
governance also advantages the creation of complex, incentive based governance
structures needed to support radical innovation in newly emerging technologies (see
Casper, 1998).
8Germany is characterized by a „coordinated market economy“ (Soskice, 1994)
underpinned by a regulatory private law system.  German business is organized in
nature, primarily due to the embeddedness of large firms within networks of powerful
trade and industry associations, as well as a similar, often legally mandated,
organization of labor and other interest organizations within para-public institutions
(Katzenstein, 1987, 1989). Businesses engage these associations to solve a variety
of incomplete contracting dilemmas and create important non-market collective
goods. For example, German employers associations maintain tacit norms and a
monitoring capacity to prevent employee poaching and in doing so lower the risks to
German large companies of training highly skilled workers within nationally specified
curriculums. To discourage individual companies from exiting the collective business
system, German public policy uses private law to regulate a wide variety of inter-firm
and labor contracts as well as create neo-corporatist bargaining environments
through the delegation of issue-area specific bargaining rights to unions and other
stake-holders within firms. German courts use standardized business agreements
produced through neo-corporatist arrangements as the basis to apply regulatory
corporate laws throughout the broader economy (Casper, 1998).
German national institutional frameworks advantage what Streeck labels
„diversified quality production“ (DQP) product market strategies that lead to
specialization in a wide number of high-quality niche markets such as industrial
machinery, specialty chemicals, high-end automobiles, and so forth (Streeck, 1992).
The German system also creates strong prohibitions against opportunistic (largely
low price competitive) product market strategies that depend on the delegation of
important risks to weaker market participants. As already noted, German industry
has suffered in high-technology industries such as biotechnology. I argue that this
weakness in high-technology industry is a direct consequence of laws and other
institutions constructed by German business and public policy-makers. Through
creating institutional frameworks to advantage a series of company organizational
competencies for DQP-style industries and – to discourage free-riding on the
collective goods necessary to make this system viable for companies competing on
world markets – punish opportunistic strategies, German firms and public policy-
makers simultaneously create institutions that dramatically raise the governance cost
of creating the competencies needed to innovate in high-technology industries. To
explore this argument in more detail, I now compare how US and German
institutional frameworks influence the creation of three of the most important
competencies for innovative start-up firms: high-powered incentive structures for
employees, high-risk financing, and the creation of viable career structures for
employees of firms that run a high risk of failure.
2.2.1 High-Risk Financing
Requirement: Biotechnology start-ups need access to a continuous stream of high-
risk finance. Three industry characteristics combine to make biotechnology one of
the riskiest segments in high-technology industry.  First, the failure rate is very high.
9The vast majority of biotechnology firms do not succeed in bringing a product to
market. In addition to cases when the firm simply is not able to successfully
innovate, even successful innovators can quickly see their intellectual property
eroded by technological advances by other firms who are quicker to market. To give
an indication of the failure problem, while there are hundreds of biotechnology start-
ups active in therapeutics research, as of 1997 only 40 drugs designed through
biotechnology research techniques had reached the market (BIO, 1998).
Second, the „burn rate“ is very high in biotechnology. Basic research costs for
specialist equipment, high salaries for scientists and researchers, and supplies (cell
cultures, tissue samples, etc.) are high. Therapeutic companies face additional costs
for testing and trials; even early stage animal and human clinical trials can run into
the tens of millions of dollars. The total R&D cost to bring a new drug to market is
between 200-325 million dollars (PhRMA, 1997). High burn rates are compounded
by a third problem, the long time-horizons before most biotech products reach the
market. This is particularly the case for therapeutic companies, which must bear a
minimum 5-7 year clinical trial and regulatory approval period before their discovers
are approved and reach the market.
„Solution“ in the US. In the United States most biotechnology firms are initially
funded by venture capitalists (see Florida and Kenney, 1986). There are important
institutional reasons why the venture capital market is so large in the US. First, very
substantial private legal competencies exist and, due to the „enabling“ nature of
ownership and contract law, can be used to create sophisticated legal structures
used to support risky new ventures. These include the high-powered performance
incentives for managers and scientists discussed above.
Second, and probably most important, in the United States the ownership of
firms is primarily financial in structure, and rooted in large capital markets (e.g.
NASDAQ, NYSE). A liquid market for corporate control is critical for venture
capitalists, as it creates a viable exit option via initial public offerings and mergers or
acquisitions by other biomedical companies. Without this exit option, it is difficult for
venture capitalists to diversify risks across several investments or create a viable
refinancing mechanism. Typically, a venture capitalists will invest in a number of
companies, expecting one or two to become successful in a few years, one or two to
survive, and several others to fail. Successful start-ups will be given supplementary
„mezzanine“ financing and eventually taken public through an IPO or sold to a larger
pharmaceutical company, usually creating a very high return for the venture
capitalists. These profits may be used to offset the losses on other companies and
thus make a portfolio strategy more viable. The exit option created by large capital
markets allows venture capitalists to shorten the time-horizon for investments
(usually to 3-5 years). Finally, by taking a firm public within a few years, venture
capitalists create a viable refinancing mechanism. They can use the profits from
IPOs to seed new ventures as well as provide secondary funding for other start-ups
(for example, to take promising candidate compounds into clinical testing).
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 „Problem“ in Germany. In Germany the ownership of most firms is only
partially financial in nature. It is also based on non-financial rights of employees and
other „stakeholders“. In connection with the historical development of German
financial markets, German company law creates incentives for most investment to be
debt-based (see Vitols et al., 1997). Shareholdings of German public firms have
traditionally been concentrated and dispersed through stable cross-shareholding
arrangements between the large German commercial banks and other large firms.
The low-risk nature of bank loans entails that most German firms have traditionally
financed R&D and other speculative investments with retained earnings. Germany
has never developed a „hostile“ market for corporate control. Until very recently,
share offerings have not served as a primary source of funding for German firms,
large or small.
The lack of developed capital markets willing to invest in speculative IPOs for
technology firms create important barriers for prospective venture capitalists. If share
offerings cannot be supported, then the „exit option“ for venture capitalists becomes
limited (primarily to M&A activities). This has two important consequences. First
without an established IPO market, possible refinancing mechanisms are decreased.
The profits from IPOs are the primary continuing source of seed money for venture
capital. Without this, venture capitalists must return to original investors to obtain
new funds. Lacking a relatively short-term prospect of a high return, it seems unlikely
that investors can be relied on to continually finance high burn-rate biotech start-
ups. Second, without the short-term returns created by IPOs, it becomes difficult for
venture capitalists to diversify risks through a portfolio strategy. The venture
capitalist must assume that it is making a long-term investment in each firm that
becomes successful, making it difficult to quickly offset loses on unsuccessful firms.
Hypothesis: Legal restraints combined with the bank-based financial system
limits the creation of market structures needed to support high-risk venture capital.
High-risk start-ups in biotechnology are thus difficult to fund in Germany.
2.2.2 Low Career Risk from Failure
Problem: As already noted, most biotech start-ups involved in therapeutics
research eventually fail. In addition, biotechnology research, even within successful
firms, is often is characterized by patterns of internal competency destruction. The
technology trajectories of even successful biotech firms are often very volatile,
meaning that as the course of technology races with other firms evolve they must
often shed research competencies in one area in order to build up new ones in
another.  As a result, the career risk of working within any given biotech firm must be
low.  This entails the development of an active labor market for scientists,
technicians, and managerial experts within biotechnology. If one firm fails or decided
to shed competencies in one area, employees must be able to obtain similar
employment without severe loss of salary or status. Top executives at start-up firms
11
typically come from large pharmaceutical companies or public university research
laboratories. These often senior scientists/managers would hesitate in making the
move to a start-up if the career risk of doing so were large.
Furthermore, as Powell (1996) and others have discussed, biotechnology is a
network based industry. Innovation is dependent on the flow of knowledge between
university labs, start-up research firms, and large pharmaceutical firms. While joint
research projects, strategic alliances and so forth facilitate this exchange of
knowledge, these network externalities are also supported by the rapid movement of
scientists and technicians across firms. Thus, if the labor market did not support
extensive lateral career mobility across firms, these network externalities would be
difficult to sustain.
„Solution“ in the US: In the United States there is an extremely active labor
market. Particularly in California (but generally throughout the US), courts have
refused to enforce „competition clauses“ written into labor contracts. While firms can
ask employees to sign non-disclosure agreements covering specific technologies,
scientists and managers are generally free to move from firm to firm as they see fit.
This has facilitated extensive poaching and the organization of career paths within
firms based on the probability of frequent employee turnover. As a result, the risk of
failure is very small (see Saxenian, 1993 for a general discussion of career-paths in
Silicon Valley).
„Problem“ in Germany. In Germany the organization of labor and company law
combined with the organizational strategies of most large companies severely
constrains the development of US-style active labor markets. Both sides of the „hire
and fire“ equation are muted. German courts routinely uphold competition clauses
written into employment contracts, with the result that scientists/managers often
cannot leave one firm to perform a similar job at a competitor for up to 1-3 years after
leaving the original firm. Similarly, German company law grants important
representative rights over personnel and working-time policy (training, overtime,
work organization) to legally mandated councils of works and middle-management,
as well as seats on the supervisory boards of public companies to employee
representatives, unions, and other „stakeholders.“ In return for cooperative labor and
employee relations and acceptance of very low powered performance incentives
within the firm, German companies have traditionally offered lifetime employment to
any employee that survives an initial six months to two-year probationary periods.
While large German firms can sell entire subsidiaries or business units or send
some lower-productivity older employees into early retirement, individual employees
or groups of employees cannot be fired within German firms as part of the „normal“
course of business.
Though there is often some lateral movement across firms very early in a
person’s career, the vast majority of German employees build careers within one
firm. Partly as a consequence, the structure of decision-making, remuneration, and
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career-paths within German firms differ fundamentally from common practice within
the United States or United Kingdom (see full discussion in Vitols et al., 1997).
Because employment is usually long-term, German firms must refrain from alienating
particular constituencies. As a result, most decision-making is consensual. Career
paths tend to be well-specified, incremental, and based on rank hierarchies. Salary
is primarily determined by seniority and educational status, rather than short-term
performance. Higher levels of salary and responsibility are only obtained as a result
of long careers within the firm.
This structure of large company organization has been found ideal for a number
of „DQP“ industries dependent on long-term investment strategies in relatively stable
technologies and the diffusion of deep skills throughout the firm (see Streeck, 1992).
In particular, it encourages the creation of tacit organizational knowledge throughout
the firm that enhances flexibility. However, this system creates fundamental
obstacles to the creation of high-risk technology start-up firms. The risk of „jumping
ship“ from an established large company (or – though there is less research in this
area – a prestigious university professorship) to a start-up firm is extremely high.
This risk includes not just the possible legal consequences (if competition clauses
are enforced), but the risk of finding oneself on the outside of an extremely rigid
labor market at mid-career. Because large German firms encourage the creation of
firm-specific tacit knowledge, mid-career managers cannot easily find similar
positions inside other large firms. In order to compensate for the career risk of
joining a risky start-up, it would seem that the start-up would have to offer very high
levels of status and/or salary in order to successfully recruit higher-level
management or scientists.
Hypothesis: German start-up biotechnology companies have a difficult time
recruiting mid career and especially senior level management and science staff, due
to the career-risk of leaving positions in large German companies.
2.2.3 High-Powered Performance Incentives
Problem: Successful research in high-technology firms requires the recruitment of
scientists with very specialized knowledge. The decentralization of knowledge
creates agency problems within the firm. It is difficult for non-scientist managers and,
in many cases, even fellow scientists to determine whether or not specialist workers
within the firm are efficiently working towards firm goals (see generally Miller, 1992).
Scientists often have strong incentives to work on projects with substantial private
returns but inferior collective returns for the company. In addition to pure agency
problems, the existence of „high-powered“ incentive structures is commonly
associated with the willingness of employees within high-technology firms to „sign-
on“ to extremely challenging work assignments requiring long hours and an
extraordinary commitment to the firm.
13
Ethnographic accounts of US biotechnology firms contain numerous examples of
agency dilemmas.  One example comes from Werth’s book The Billion Dollar
Molecule. A goal of many biotech firms to uncover the chemical structure of large
proteins involved in disease processes. Werth examines problems encountered by
the biotech start-up Vertex in its quest to uncover the molecular structure of an
important protein thought to be involved in the immune system. The firm invested in
two approaches, traditional X-ray crystallography and a newer approach based on
MRI scanning. The firm hired a specialist for each area, both of which began working
independently to discover the protein structure. Each scientist had a tremendous
incentive to discover the protein by himself, in order to gain sole credit for an
important discovery in the subsequent journal publication. As a result, the two
scientists refused for months to share their partial results, which could have been
combined to uncover the complete structure at an earlier stage of research. Finally,
company management forced the scientists to work jointly, but the delay eventually
forced the firm to share publication priority with rivals outside the firm.
„Solution“ in the US.  Agency problems are perhaps the major reason why
most biotechnology firms are small (rarely more than 10-50 people, including
administrative staff) or, in the case of larger companies investing in biotechnology,
organized into semi-autonomous decentralized labs. Small numbers facilitates
mutual monitoring. However, the vast majority of US start-up technology firms have
complemented small-numbers with very strong financial incentives. Most companies
do this with share-options, coupled with the announced intention of owners and
venture capitalist to take the firm public within a few years. In the cases of successful
firms that have gone public, share options can be worth tens of thousands of dollars
to junior staff to millions to senior scientists and owner/managers. The prospect of
large financial rewards helps align the private incentives of scientists with those of
companies and is a prime reason why US high-tech firms have become associated
with extremely long work-weeks and general dedication to projects.
„Problem“ in Germany. Financial incentives cannot easily be used to resolve
agency problems within German firms. This area is undergoing extensive change
during the late 1990s, but during the 1980s the organization of German financial
markets and property rights law made share-based financial systems difficult to
implement. In order to limit share-price speculation, German financial laws have until
very recently prohibited listed companies from buying back shares already on the
market. Doing so eliminates the strategy of issuing pure share-options. Privately
held start-up companies could instead grant shares to employees. However,
particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s nothing comparable to the NASDAQ or
other small-firm technology market existed in Germany. Stock market capitalization
was, even for large companies, small, and there was no established IPO (initial
public offering) market for high-tech firms. At most, employers holding shares could
hope that another firm would acquire the company.
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Hypothesis. The lack of „high-powered“ incentives within German start-up firms
exacerbates agency problems while making it difficult for mangers to convince
employees to „sign-on“ to complex projects (i.e. through long work-weeks, intense
work environments, and so forth). Table 2 summarizes these arguments. 1
Table 2 here
3. Developments During the 1990s and Possibilities for Institutional
Reform
During the 1990s the creation of high-tech industry has become a major
preoccupation with German political and business leaders. In Germany there is
currently a large push by the government to promote the development of a
biotechnology sector comparable to that in the United States. The federal and
Länder governments have created a framework to support over a dozen local
„BioRegio“ technology promotion infrastructures. While the total amount of money
spent on the BioRegio program is difficult to assess due to the program’s
decentralization, over a billion DM has been spent in support of the Munich Gene
Center alone, and Berlin, Cologne, Stuttgart, and the Heidelberg region each have
programs of smaller size. Public spending has been aimed primarily in two areas:
infrastructure and subsidies. Infrastructure includes the creation of technology parks
and „incubator labs,“ often tied closely to existing or newly created basic research
facilities tied to local universities or Max Planck Institutes. Subsidies are usually
provided as seed-capital for start-up firms. Programs vary, but in general money is
provided only if applicants are able to concurrently secure private investment capital.
This catalyst has created a biotech boom in Germany. From scarcely a handful
of companies at the beginning of the 1990s, as of mid-1998 there were over 400
firms in Germany (Ernst and Young, 1998c). Given these substantial institutional
hurdles to the creation of viable organizational, financial, and career-structures for
biotechnology, why has German technology policy targeted biotechnology as a major
„industry of the future“?
Before returning to the core theme of creating a viable institutional environment
for start-up firms, it is first important to examine whether, from an industry-dynamics
                                           
1
 This analysis has largely ignored an important alternative explanation.  Legal restrictions requiring
administrative authorizations of all biotechnology testing combined with hostile public opinion are
commonly held to be the primary cause of Germany’s poor performance in biotechnology during
the 1980s (see Handelsblatt 1996).  These legal restrictions were phased out in 1993.
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perspective, large-scale entry into the biotechnology industry is still possible during
the 1990s.
3.1. Is it Feasible for German Firms to Compete in Biotechnology?
From the perspective of industry dynamics alone, barriers to entry into most
segments of the biotechnology sector remain low. This conclusion derives from three
major features of the biotechnology sector:
3.1.1 The Markets for Biotechnology is Booming.
In recent years the spectrum of molecular biology based advanced drug design and
gene-engineering techniques has emerged as the dominant science paradigm in the
pharmaceutical and life-science industries more generally.  As a result,
biotechnology-based drugs should obtain an increasingly larger share of the world
pharmaceutical market. Revenues for the biotechnology industry were over $13
billion in 1997 (of which $9 billion went to the US industry), and while the number of
drugs actually approved remains small, over 290 drugs are in clinical testing phases
in the United States (BIO, 1998:5).
As a response to this boom, biotechnology has during the 1990s taken off in
Europe. The European industry is now approaching in size that of the United States.
As of 1997 there were 1287 biotechnology companies in the United States and 1027
in the European Union (though overall employment was much higher in the US due
to relative maturity of the US industry) (BIO, 1998: 5; Ernst and Young, 1998b: 3).
High-risk venture capital for biotechnology has shifted to Europe. Ernst and Young
estimates that in 1997 European biotech firms raised about Ecu 385 million,
compared to the $773 million in the Untied States (Ernst and Young 1998a: 49; Ernst
and Young 1998b: 19). While there has been a moderate biotech boom in Germany,
biotechnology start-up firms have particularly thrived in the United Kingdom, a
country that has developed an institutional environment for high technology that
mimics crucial aspects of that in the US. In both 1995 and 1996 well over half of all
European biotech venture capital has been invested in the UK (Ernst and Young
1998b: 41), and the UK continues to support the most biotech start-ups in the EU
(Ernst and Young, 1998b: 3).
Of particular importance to German firms is the emergence in recent years of a
large market for „platform technologies.“ While intellectual property and general
know-how remains extremely specialized across therapeutic areas, there are an
increasing number of generic biotechnology competencies applicable across large
segments of the field. Examples include firms that apply information technology and
advanced testing methods to small-molecule drug design (combinatorial chemistry),
firms specializing in gene sequencing and the construction of specialized libraries
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from the human genome, and firms that specialize in the creation of equipment and
research methods used in genetic engineering (PCR, for example). Lead-times are
much shorter for most platform technology firms, since sales are usually on a
contract basis and immediate. As we will see below, targeting platform technologies
is an especially viable option for German firms, since the relative financial and
technological stability of these firms may „fit“ better with normal German financial
and labor market institutions.
3.1.2 Existence of Advanced Lead Users.
In industries where technologies are changing very quickly, the success of particular
companies often depends on the development of dynamic relationships with the
users of the end-technology. For example, Borrus and Cohen (1998) argue that US
networking firms have dominated data-driven communication markets in part
because large American corporations demanded a wealth of new IT technologies
much earlier than their European or Japanese counterparts.
A similar logic exists in pharmaceuticals. The large pharmaceutical companies
are the primary market for biotechnology start-ups; it is the existing large
pharmaceutical companies that eventually purchase or license, or market most of the
drugs or other products created at biotech companies. Pharmaceutical companies
have access to vast small-molecule libraries, testing facilities, manufacturing
process expertise, and, of particular importance, know-how in guiding candidate
drugs through clinical testing and regulatory approval. Pharmaceutical companies
have massively invested in joint-research projects with biotech start-ups – creating
the network-based learning possibilities that are often crucial to success in quickly
changing technologies.
In Germany advanced lead users exist, in the form of the pre-existing large
integrated chemical/pharmaceutical companies (Hoechst, Bayer, BASF, Schering).
While German computer and telecommunication firms languished in part because
German business was very late to switch to advanced IT networks, German
pharmaceutical companies have in recent years recognized that biotechnology
(broadly defined) has become a defining methodology in life-science industries.
Hoechst and Bayer are shedding industrial chemical subsidiaries to focus primarily
on „life-science“ competencies. Hoechst has gone the furthest down this route,
announcing that biotechnology has become the core unifying science methodology
throughout the company. While German pharmaceutical companies have invested
large amounts of resources in the US and UK biotechnology industries, they have a
natural interest in nurturing German biotechnology. This is in part because local
research networks are easier to maintain (e.g. fewer cultural barriers, plus the local
firms should have an advantage in accessing the German market). Moreover, by
nurturing German biotechnology firms, human resource and organizational expertise
will be developed that can (through buy-outs or alliances) then be transferred to the
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existing pharmaceutical companies as they develop their own in-house
biotechnology competencies.
3.1.3 Technological and Intellectual Property Structures Favor Entry.
Ease of market entry is a chief reason why thousands of biotechnology start-ups
have emerged world-wide over the last 25 years. For an industry some 25 years old,
the lack of concentration within biotechnology is amazing. Firm size remains
relatively small: some 39,000 people are employed in the EU industry, while the
average employement within the EU’s top ten biotech firms, in terms of market
capitalization, stands at only 390 (Ernst and Young, 1998b: 12-13). Notwithstanding
the recent appearance of platform technologies, intellectual property in
pharmaceuticals is very fragmented across literally hundreds of separate research
trajectories. Though patents for individual drugs (and artificially created gene
sequences) are strong, in very few disease areas do „blocking“ patents exist. For
example, in the study of Alzheimer’s Disease mentioned earlier, Penan showed that
there were 15 ongoing separate research clusters for this one disease. Intellectual
property across these separate research clusters apparently has not overlapped in
such a way as to „block“ on-going research within competing research clusters. To
give another indication of the ease of entry, according to a recent industry analysis,
some 90% of patented drugs have direct competitors, and there exist three or more
direct competitors for 15 of the 20 top selling drugs (Powell, 1996: 204).
The situation in pharmaceuticals differs dramatically from that within
semiconductors and computers, another industry in which intellectual property plays
a defining role. Grindley and Teece (1997) have argued that intellectual property in
semiconductors can block new entry. Patents in this area tend to be very broad, in
that patents for new circuit designs and so forth cannot be easily „reengineered“ and
thus circumvented. Furthermore, there tend to be a number of key technologies in
each area that tend to be held by several firms. These firms must sign cross license
each other’s intellectual property in order to innovate. This creates a severe
handicap on small start-ups that lack tradable patents.
3.2 Possibilities for Institutional Reform
German national institutional frameworks are likely to develop along one of three
trajectories. A first scenario is convergence. According to this view, given the
pressures of globalization and the inability to reconfigure existing German
institutional arrangements to support radical innovation, Germany must be
transformed into a liberal market economy, allowing German companies to adopt
forms of organization advantaged by liberal-market economies. Resistance to these
changes, driven by a robustness of the current institutional equilibrium, could result
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in a second scenario, specialization. This is the arrangement widely seen to exist in
the 1980s and early 1990s (see Hollingsworth, 1997). Differences in national
institutional structures advantage a different constellation of organizational
structures and associated product market strategies. In this scenario, globalization,
rather than a cause of convergence, could actually strengthen national differences,
as large multinational companies create international product chains locating
activities in the political economy best advantaging the required company
organizational characteristics. A final, advantageous solution for Germany is an
accommodation of the present institutional frameworks to support at least minimal
forms of entrepreneurial science-based innovation, without undermining the
country’s ability to support other medium-tech high value-added industries.
Organizational patterns might differ substantially from those in the United States, but
nevertheless allow successful innovation strategies to ensue.
Although some interesting changes are taking place, there is little evidence that
the convergence scenario is coming to pass. The case against the convergence
scenario is best presented through data comparing the relative specialization of the
US and Germany during the 1990s in a broad array of industries. Recent EPO
patent data suggest that, as of 1993/94, extreme differences continue to exist in US
and German industry specialization (Casper et. al., forthcoming). Drawing on this
data, table 3 ranks the top and bottom five industries for the US and Germany in
terms of patent specialization.
Table 3 here
This data reveals close to an inverse relationship in terms of patent specialization.
Germany excels relative to the United States in a number of engineering industries
(civil and nuclear engineering, engines, transport) - all of which are process-oriented
industries that broadly fit into the „diversified quality production“ classification. US
industry, on the other hand, excels relative to Germany in an array of high-tech
industries (information technology, semiconductors, optics). Based on these industry
specialization statistics, the convergence scenario appears weakly supported.
Furthermore, while changes to German national institutional framework are
ongoing, these changes are incremental in nature and still aim primarily to
advantage DQP rather than high-technology company organizational strategies.
Among the most important institutional reform is a new law that permits companies to
introduce share-option schemes. As knowledge continues to become more
decentralized across most sectors in the economy, a general interest within the
German business community in developing sharper incentive structures for
employees has emerged.  This led to a debate over the role of share-options in large
German firms. The advantage of share options is that they can be introduced on a
collective basis across the firm, without disturbing normal consensus-based
decision-making patterns. After circulating within the German parliament for over two
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years, a legislative bill allowing companies to buy and sell their own shares (the
prerequisite for share-option schemes) was approved in March 1998.
Otherwise, there are no other signs that the broadly „social“ constitution of
German large firms will be replaced by a more US/UK style financial system of
ownership. There has been very little debate on dismantling other aspects of
German company organization, such as the two-tier board system or the installation
of powerful employee counsels for labor and middle-management.  Similarly,
competition clauses are still upheld by courts while German company and labor law
continues to continues to promote a stake-holder system, which strongly encourages
firms to adopt the lifetime employment model and its consequent impact on company
decision-making, career-trajectories, and remuneration. As a result, active labor
markets for mid-career managers and scientists continue to be underdeveloped.
Incremental changes are also occurring within the financial system. Often in
combination with the introduction of share-option performance incentives, many
large German firms have embraced dispersed equity offerings as a common
instrument to raise investment capital. Public interest has been catalyzed by the
highly publicized Deutsche Telekom share offering in 1996, the emergence of
numerous low-cost stock brokerages in Germany (especially on the Internet), and
exuberance created by the soaring level of the blue-chip DAX index, which has more
than doubled in the last two years. In 1997 a new exchange tailored for smaller,
higher risk companies was created, the Neue Markt. Over sixty companies have
since sold shares on the Neue Markt, including one highly successful Dutch-German
platform technology biotech company (Qiagen) and a Swiss-based venture capital
company that specializes in biotechnology investments (BB-Biotech).
What do these changes entail for prospective German high-tech start-up
companies? Most promising, German start-up firms will soon be able to offer high-
powered incentive structures in the form of share-options. In addition, the Neue
Markt, if it continues to develop, presents the opportunity of a legitimate market for
small-firm IPOs in Germany. If a legitimate market for German high-tech IPOs is
sustained, this will also go a long way towards creating an „exit option“ for venture
capitalists. As already noted, this is critical if a viable refinancing mechanism is to
develop in Germany and also allows venture capitalists to more easily diversify risks.
While these changes are important, it is important to ask which type of firms are
likely to be funded through these new markets. As of mid-1998, extremely high
market valuations for not just „blue chip“ established large firms but also most of the
higher risk Neue Markt suggests that German investors are willing to accept risks on
a level with those commonly found in the United States or United Kingdom. Such a
conclusion, however, ignores several important facts about the structure of German
equity markets and the effect of German company law on company strategy.
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The major source of finance in Germany continues to be debt and, for
established firms, retained earnings. German equity market capitalization in
November 1996 was only 27% of GDP, compared to 122% in the United States and
152% in the United Kingdom (of the major OECD countries, only Austria comes in
lower, at 14%) (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996:28). Furthermore, despite increased
interest in the stock market, actual equity ownership is extremely narrow: while some
47% of US citizens directly own stocks or equity-based mutual funds, only about 5%
of Germans directly hold equities. Though international investors (e.g. US/UK
pension funds) are an important new source of finance, as a source of finance
German equity markets remain much thinner than in the US or UK.
It is also questionable whether the current, highly speculative company
valuations can be maintained in Germany. As the current expansion of the DAX into
a market with widely traded and dispersed shares is only a few years old, the market
has no track record of performance through the normal business cycle. German
equity prices are also buoyed by high earning expectations due to the fact that the
economy is (during 1998) finally emerging from a multi-year recession.
Furthermore, it is likely that new and especially international holders of German
equities hold the mistaken assumption that German firms are operating within a
similar institutional environment as US or UK companies. While important changes
are taking place, it would be erroneous to conclude that Germany is marching
towards the US/UK national institutional infrastructure. As already highlighted,
virtually no changes have occurred in German company or labor law. German firms
are encouraged to make long-term bets on market and technological trajectories, to
train deeply within the firm, and make use of these resources when making
decisions. German management cannot quickly cut assets or embark on the „hire
and fire“ trajectories often seen in the United States (and increasingly, the UK). In
part because they are controlled by coalitions of company representatives and
concentrated share-holders (e.g. banks), German supervisory boards have
systematically refused to offer top management the extremely high performance
related pay packages coupled with extreme managerial control that is typical in US
or UK public firms (Vitols et al., 1997)
While German firms have successfully competed in the variety of „DQP“ product
market segments noted above, these established, largely process-innovation based
markets usually do not create the growth opportunities presented in the high-tech
product innovation based markets that US and UK firms tend to dominate.  In
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon „high-risk, high return“ model of company strategy, the
strategies advantaged in Germany are best seen through a „low risk, low return“
lens. While German organizational structures usually prevents firms from making
large strategic errors, this means that these firms are usually much slower to react
and fully commit to major changes in technology or market organization.
Biotechnology is a good case in point. As discussed above, the big-three German
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chemical/pharma companies were very slow in reacting to the changed scientific and
market conditions in pharmaceuticals during the 1980s.
In general, there is little evidence that German national institutional frameworks
have converged to a liberal market economy model. They do not facilitate the use of
similar governance structures to support high-technology start-up firms that have
been created in the United States and Germany. More open to debate is whether
German managers, scientists, and investors can embrace piece-meal reforms in
company law as well as a slight deepening in German equity markets to make the
accommodation scenario viable.
The final strategy, „accommodation“, recognizes that important national institutional
frameworks in Germany are oriented primarily to advantage other company
strategies, but attempts to use a variety of alternative private sector or governmental
devices to create governance structures supporting at least minimal forms of the
desired company organizational structures. For this to happen, however, German
companies would need to create new governance structures for biotechnology that
do not merely mimic those already developed in the United States. Because the
accommodation strategy relies on the creative design or reconstruction of new
governance structures, it is difficult to specify with precision what this strategy might
entail. However, focusing again on biotechnology start-ups, there are at least four
components of an accommodation strategy that firms and interested governmental
actors might usefully keep in mind:
a) Firms should specialize in lower-risk niche markets. Table 4 summarizes the
four principal market segments in bio-medical related biotechnology. Important
differences exist in risk profile across these segments. Given the difficulties that exist
in sustaining high-risk strategies within the German institutional environment, it
follows that German firms should gravitate into market niches that avoid the high-risk
„races“ to develop highly specific intellectual property in particular disease areas
and the long-lead times that characterize the therapeutics area. In fact, this is the
preferred strategy of most German bio-tech start-ups. In a recent survey of Europe’s
biotech firms, Ernst and Young found that while close to 40% of European biotech
firms are developing therapeutic products, less than 20% of German firms are in this
field. Conversely, about 30% of German firms are developing platform technologies,
compared to less than 20% for the European industry as a whole (Ernst and Young,
1998c: 19). When German biotech firms were asked to list the areas of their
research activities, therapeutics came in fifth, ranked well below contract research
and manufacturing, platform technologies, diagnostics, and „other services.“ (Ernst
and Young, 1998c: 17).
As foreshadowed earlier, it is no surprise that the most successful German
biotechnology firms are in platform technology and other service-provision
segments. In addition to Qiagen, which has become one of the few profitable
European biotech firms, three of the four German biotech start-ups that are close to
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launching share-offerings on the Neue Markt are platform technology firms
(Wirtschaftswoche, 1998: 138-139). These firms are not „typical“ German
organizations, in that they use high-powered incentive structures and often rely upon
the intense work-environments that characterize American or British high-tech firms.
However, because the platform technologies are generic, scientific competencies
are generally much more stable than in therapeutic firms. Unlike most therapeutic
research, platform technology research is generally not competency destroying.
Furthermore, as intermediary producers of products used by other biomedical firms
or labs, lead-times are generally shorter. These factors lower the need for long-term
high-risk finance and the career-risk of working within such a firm.
Table 4 here
b) Create new governance structures. Firms can create supplementary
governance structures to compensate for underlying institutional weakness.
Organizational patterns might differ substantially from those in liberal market
economies, but nevertheless allow successful radical innovation strategies to ensue.
For this to happen, however, German companies would need to create new
governance structures for biotechnology that do not merely mimic those created in
the US or UK. Such hybrid organizational forms might emulate characteristics of the
US model (smaller network forms of organization with high-powered performance
incentives), but with more stability in structure of labor markets or finance.
One example of this strategy has originated within large pharmaceutical firms.
Hoechst and BASF have both initiated in-house incubator labs designed to allow
employees to organize start-up firms. Ownership will be divided between the host-
firm and the managers and scientists that organizing the new venture. Successful
firms are expected to be placed on German or international equity markets through
IPOs. While these incubator firms will have preferential access to materials,
scientific equipment, and other assets, the hope is that high-powered incentive
structures and autonomy will help recreate the highly creative atmospheres found in
„true“ start-ups.  Schemes of this sort should provide an effective solution to the
career-structure problem: if a large company incubator firm fails, the managers and
scientists presumably can return to normal positions within the firm
A second new organizational form has originated out of many of the regional
„BioRegio“ programs in connection with universities and other public research labs.
In contrast to the wide engagement of US academics in the biotechnology industry,
during the 1980s and early 1990s German academic researchers in the biosciences
were usually portrayed as aloof from commercial developments in their research
fields. During the late 1990s this situation has dramatically changed: perhaps the
most common source of most biotech start-ups are established public research labs
in the bio-sciences. German research labs differ from those in the United States and
the United Kingdom in one key regard: while US/UK universities have jealously
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guarded intellectual property developed by their employees, German universities
generally cede full control over intellectual property to the professor/student
inventors.
This intellectual property has become a prime source of collateral used to
secure venture capital start-up financing for biotech start-ups. Many German
universities and public research institutes have worked with regional „BioRegio“
technology agencies to develop „gene centers“ affiliated with established
institutions. These often include „incubator labs“ located in technology parks located
in close proximity to public bioscience labs. Many of Germany’s biotech start-up
firms are actually tiny offices designed to manage commercial spin-offs that emerge
out of basic research conducted within public bio-medical labs. If a discovery merits
further development (i.e. early stage trials) that cannot be paid through normal basic
research grants, scientists connected to the basic research lab can take full-time
employment at the company. However, this governance form again provides
employment protection for senior scientists. If the spin-off company becomes
extremely successful and obtains long-term financing (through, for example, the
licensing of a discovery to a large pharmaceutical firm), senior scientists may leave
their public research posts to work in the private sector. Otherwise, senior scientists
can safely retain their public professor/research post while retaining a large financial
stake in the associated spin-off firm.
c) Embrace globalization to develop competencies that cannot be easily
developed within Germany. While German large pharmaceutical firms during the late
1980s attempted to bridge their internal technology gaps through investing in US
biotech, the opposite can also be true. One option is to tap into international equity
markets through taking listings on foreign exchanges. For example, Qiagen used its
success to tap into US financial markets through being listed on NASDAQ.
A second option is to recruit foreign scientists and managers to work in German
start-ups. Personnel recruited from the United States or United Kingdom, for
example, can easily move back into their more flexible home labor markets.
Recruiting foreign specialists is a core strategy of firms working in connection with
the Munich Gene Center, the most successful of the German biotech clusters.  Most
start-ups associated with the Munich Gene Center, for example, have recruited
American or British chief financial officers or have enticed German expatriates
working within the US pharmaceutical industry to return to manage many of the new
firms. Similarly, having created a world class infrastructure to support molecular
biology research, the University of Munich has been able to use a large fellowship
program to attract a number of experienced scientists from foreign countries, many
of which spend part of their time within local start-up firms.
d) Make selective use of governmental policy to fill gaps in private-sector
incentive structures. German industrial policy has circumvented the critical problem
of finding seed-money for most of the current crop of biotech start-up firms. Most of
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the German subsidy programs demand that each applicant find a private investor
(usually a bank but occasionally a venture capital firm or large pharmaceutical firm).
Governmental subsidies then supplement the seed money provided by venture
capitalist. The vast majority of German biotech start-ups founded since 1995 have
depended on governmental matching grants. Through essentially halving the cost of
capital governmental subsidies have created incentives for foreign and domestic
venture capital firms to invest in German biotech. According to German biotech
experts, the subsidies provided by the BioRegio and various Länder programs have
essentially solved the capital formation problem in Germany
Governmental subsidy programs are short-term in nature. They do not assure a
viable long-term source of capital for German start-up firms; neither are these
programs geared to provide the „mezzanine“ financing needed to sustain the high
burn-rates commonly found in biotechnology. In the long-term, German firms should
work to develop governance structures that do not rely on direct governmental
intervention. Only then will institutional frameworks exist that can create and
reproduce viable governance structures for high-tech firms over the long-term. Both
the US and UK biotech industries rely primarily on favorable national institutional
frameworks in the finance and company organizational areas discussed throughout
the paper. In the long-term, the best German governmental policy for biotechnology
will most likely consist of large financing for basic research in molecular biology and
medicine. The German Research Ministry (BMBF) now spends some DM 3.5 billion
annually on Max Planck Institutes and university labs involved in bio-medical
research. However, even correcting for differences in country size, this sum pales in
comparison with the some $14 billion annually spent by the US National Institute of
Health on bio-medical research (about $3.5 billion of which is for biotechnology
research) (Abramson et. al 1997).
4. Conclusion: Reconfiguring National Institutions to Promote
Innovation.
Why has the creation of viable institutions to support biotech start-ups in Germany
been so difficult? A general conclusion emerging from this case study is that national
institutional frameworks are complementary in nature. Complementarities are
present when „doing more of one activity increases (or at least does not decrease)
the marginal profitability of each other activity in the group“ (Milgrom and Roberts,
1992: 108; see also Hall and Soskice, forthcoming). While in Germany the
institutional complementarities between finance, career development and skill-
formation, and company organization advantage a variety of „DQP“ product market
strategies, we have seen how, especially during the 1980s these same institutions
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create severe problems for German firms attempting to create high-technology start-
up firms.
When institutional frameworks are highly interdependent in this sense, dramatic
institutional reforms that run counter to the broad logic of industry coordination in an
economy become difficult. While some German high-tech firms currently demand the
opening of labor markets and the deregulation of wage bargaining, most German
firms resist this because it could radically lower the value of vocational and career
training while increasing wage costs for highly skilled workers and managers.
Reforms to support high-technology are only possible when they gain the support of
German industry more widely. The important reform of German financial law that
allows high-tech start-ups to distribute share-options was viable because most
German large companies are interested in using share-options to strengthen group
performance incentives.
Given these constraints, the short-term success of German promotional policies
for biotechnology is quite remarkable. We have seen that the governance structures
used to organize start-ups generally follow the „accommodation“ strategy. Firms
have made use of generous infrastructure provision and financial subsidies provided
by the numerous German „BioRegio“ programs to reduce much of the financial risk
imposed by biotechnology. Career-risks have been reduced through importing
foreign financial and scientific specialists to fill many of the higher-risk positions,
while creating new employment relationships that have allowed senior German
mangers and scientists to maintain positions public research labs or larger firms
while working within start-up firms. Finally, German firms have by and large avoided
the higher-risk, longer time-horizon therapeutic area by specializing in the lower-risk
product segments in platform technologies and related service areas.
However, the problem of creating viable institutions to promote firms with radical
innovation competencies is by no means resolved in Germany. German technology
policy has been aimed primarily to fill gaps in the institutional frameworks that
influence new firm creation. Now that large numbers of start-up firms exist, new
problems associated with nurturing these firms in viable commercial enterprises are
inevitable.
For example, the German industry must develop viable refinancing mechanisms
to satisfy the constant hunger of biotech start-ups for fresh investment capital. In
their recent survey of German biotechnology, the consulting firm Ernst and Young
see the lack of capital investment in new product development equipment as a key
weakness of the German industry (Ernst and Young, 1998c: 8). German venture
capital is currently abundant, but due to the availability of large subsidies for start-up
firms, might be flowing primarily in this direction rather than as „mezzanine“ financing
for established firms. This would force firms to invest their initial seed capital much
more conservatively than their competitors with fairly secure access to secondary
financing, accounting for lower capital investment in Germany.
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Similarly, it is unclear if the German biotechnology industry has developed
institutions that can effectively deal with firm failures. Will unsuccessful firms be
allowed to fail and, if so, can the resources within these firms be efficiently
recombined into new ventures or absorbed by other companies? What will happen to
the scientists and mangers of failed start-ups? Will they be quickly absorbed into
other start-ups along the US/UK labor market model, or will they retreat back into
their prior public research or large firm careers?  Overall, creating viable governance
structure to support high-technology start-up firms in Germany will remain a difficult
challenge for the foreseeable future.
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Table 1: International Comparison of Market Characteristics
USA Japan Ger Fra UK
Market size ($ bn)
1987 39.3 30.2 11.8 10.2   8.2
1993 70.8 51.1 19.5 17.1 14.9
R&D Intensity (%)
1983 10.6 6.7 8.4 7.1 11.7
1992 14.3 9.8 9.2 8.7 16.3
New Chemical Entities (NCEs)
1971-80 154  74  91  98  29
1981-90 142 129  67  37  28
No. of products in Top 50
1985 23 5 5 1   9
1990 27 2 5 0 12
Patent trends
1980-84 49.8 13.3 10.4 5.1   7.5
1990-94 54.6 14.7  7.8 4.7   5.3
Firm’s market share in the US
1991 70.2 0.3 4.6 1.2 14.6
Source: Casper and Matraves, 1997
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Table 2: Company Organizational Requirements and Institutional Frameworks in the United States and
Germany
Company Organizational Requirement „Solution“ in US „Problem“ in Germany
High-powered
performance
incentives
Risky research requires
recruitment of scientists with
very specialized knowledge.
High-powered incentives
needed to reduce monitoring
problems/align incentives.
Extensive use of share-
options or outright share
dispersal coupled with
possibility of IPO or buy-out
is used to align private
preferences with firms’.
Stock options illegal until March
1998; lack of IPO market limits
„strength“ of other share
schemes.
Low career risk from
failure
Most therapeutics oriented
biotech start-ups fail, so
career risk of failure must be
low.  Innovation might require
knowledge transfer created by
networks of scientists moving
between start-ups, university
labs, and pharma firms.
Extremely active labor
market.  Competition clauses
illegal.  This facilitates
extensive poaching and the
organization of career paths
within firms based on
probability of frequent
employee turnover.
Competition clauses and long-
term career paths at large
German firms prevent the
creation of an active labor market
for mid-career
scientists/managers.  Risk of
joining-start-ups high.
High risk financing Most biotech start-ups in
therapeutics require very high
risk financing due to long-term
nature of discovery and
development process plus risk
of losing innovation races.
Large venture capital market.
IPOs and large market for
M&As allows VCs to diversify
risks across several
investments and also creates
a short to medium term
refinancing market.
Bank-centered financial system.
Small IPO market limits private-
sector refinancing mechanisms.
VCs do not have viable „exit
strategy,“ meaning most
investments are long-term.
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Table 3: US and German Patent Specialization Rankings 1993/94
United States Germany
1 Information technology Civil engineering
2 Medical engineering Nuclear engineering
3 Semiconductors Agricultural machines
4 Organic chemistry Transport
5 Optics Engines
…
26 Consumer goods Semiconductors
27 Agricultural machines New materials
28 Nuclear engineering Audiovisual technology
29 Civil engineering Optics
30 Machine tools Information technology
Source: Specialization index of European Patent Office (EPO) patents of German
and United States Origin in relation to the average distribution at the EPO for the
period 1993 to 1994. The rankings are derived from the complete tables in Harhoff
and Soskice (forthcoming) based on the methodology introduced in ISI/FhI 1997.
The ranking for biotechnology is 6 in the United States and 22 in Germany.
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Table 4: Bio-Medical Related Market Segments
Category Definition Examples R&D costs Time to Market Risk Profile
Therapeutics Develop products to
improve the
treatment of disease
Apply a variety of molecular
biology methodologies to
discover/design drugs
High (due to
uncertainty of
research results and
high costs of
preclinical and
clinical testing)
Long (usually 7-10
years, due to length
of testing and
regulatory approval
process)
High
Diagnostics Develop tools to help
identify diseases
Develop antibodies for use in
diagnostic procedures; Some
use of genetic technologies (e.g.
PCR) to test for herediatary or
acquired genetic diseases
Medium to high
(research risk can be
high; testing and
regulatory costs
exist, but are lower
than in therapeutics)
Medium (regulatory
approval and testing
requirements are
shorter/less severe)
Medium to
High
Platform
Technologies
Create enabling
technologies with
broad application
Genetic sequencing or
engineering services; the
creatioon of consumables for
use in molecular biology lab
procedures; combinatorial
chemistry and other automation
technologies; genomics
Low to medium
(technologies can be
very uncertain, but
usually few
regulatory approval
or testing
requirements)
Short (direct sales to
other life-science
companies/labs)
Varies, but
generally Low
to Medium
Contract
Research /
Manufacturing
Perform customized
biochemical related
services for other
companies
The manufacturing of
customized biochemical
products; specialized services
such as equipment servicing or
quality control certification
Low Short (direct sales to
other life-science
companies/labs)
Low
Categories and definitions paraphrased from Ernst and Young 1998 European Life Sciences Report, pp. 5-6
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